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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal extraction policy of an oil
field as well as the efficient taxation of the revenues gen-
erated. Taking into account the fact that the oil price in
worldwide commodity markets fluctuates randomly fol-
lowing global and seasonal macroeconomic parameters,
we model the evolution of the oil price as a mean revert-
ing regime-switching jump diffusion process. Given that
oil producing countries rely on oil sale revenues as well
as taxes levied on oil companies for a good portion of
the revenue side of their budgets, we formulate this prob-
lem as a differential game where the two players are the
mining company whose aim is to maximize the revenues
generated from its extracting activities and the govern-
ment agency in charge of regulating and taxing natural
resources. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium
and the convergence of an approximating scheme for the
value functions. Furthermore, optimal extraction and fis-
cal policies that should be applied when the equilibrium
is reached are derived. A numerical example is presented
to illustrate these results.
1 Introduction
Oil and natural gas have always been the main sources of
revenues for a large number of developing countries as
well as some industrialized countries around the world.
Oil extraction policies vary from a country to another. In
some countries, the extraction is done by a state-owned
corporation in others it is done by foreign multinationals.
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The earliest work on the extraction of natural resources
was done by Hotelling (1931) who derived an optimal
extraction policy under the assumption that the commod-
ity price is constant. Many economists have proposed
various extensions of the Hotelling model by taking into
account the uncertainty and randomness of commodity
prices.
The majority of oil extraction contracts signed be-
tween multinational oil companies and governments of
oil-rich nations are in the form of profit sharing agree-
ments where each party will take a fraction of the prof-
its. In addition, the host nation is also entitled to collect
tax from all companies. This creates a very interesting
dynamic for these two parties with converging as well
as conflicting interests during the lifetime of the min-
ing contract. We formulate this problem as a differen-
tial game where the two players are the multinational oil
company and the government. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first time this approach is used to charac-
terize the interplay between extraction and taxation of oil
or natural gas. It is also self-evident that the price of oil in
commodity exchange markets fluctuates following divers
macroeconomic and global geopolitical forces. In this
paper, we use the mean reverting regime switching Le´vy
processes to model the oil price. Oil prices also display
a great deal of seasonality, jumps, and spikes due to var-
ious supply disruptions and political turmoils in oil-rich
countries. We use regime-switching jump diffusions to
capture all those effects. Thus our pricing model closely
captures the instability of oil markets. The paper is or-
ganized as follows. In the next section, we formulate the
problem under consideration. In Section 3, we prove the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. And in section 4, we
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construct a finite difference approximation scheme and
prove its convergence to the value functions. Finally, in
section 5, we give a numerical example.
2 Problem formulation
Consider a multinational oil company who enters into
a Production Sharing Agreement with the government
of an oil-rich country with expiration 0 < T < ∞.
Both parties will share the profits from the sales of the
extracted oil on world markets following a simple rule
where the company takes 100θ percent and the govern-
ment takes 100(1 − θ) percent of the profits, for some
θ ∈ (0, 1) . We assume that the market value of a barrel
of oil at time t is St = eXt . In fact, we assume that the
oil price follows an exponential Le´vy model, these mod-
els are natural extensions of the celebrated Black-Scholes
model. Given that oil prices are very sensitive global
macroeconomic and geopolitical shocks, we model Xt
as a mean reverting regime switching Le´vy process with
two states. Let α(t) ∈ M = {1, 2} be a finite state
Markov chain that captures the state of the oil market:
α(t) = 1 indicates the bull market at time t and α(t) = 2
represents a bear market at time t. Let the matrix Q be
the generator of α(t). Let (ηt)t be a Le´vy process and
let N be the Poisson random measure of (ηt)t. Let ν
be the Le´vy measure of (ηt)t. The differential form of
N is denoted by N(dt, dz), we define the differential
N¯(dt, dz) as follows: N¯(dt, dz) = N(dt, dz)− ν(dz)dt
if |z| < 1 and N¯(dt, dz) = N(dt, dz) if |z| ≥ 1.
We assume that the Le´vy measure ν has finite intensity,
Γ :=
∫
R
ν(dz) < ∞. Let K < ∞ be the total size of
the oil field at the beginning of the lease, and let Y (t) be
the size of the remaining reserve of the oil field by time
t, obviously Y (t) ∈ [0,K]. We model the evolution of
the profit sharing agreement as a differential game where
the two players are the oil company and the government.
The state variables of our differential game areX(t) ∈ R
and Y (t) ∈ [0,K], and the state space is R× [0,K], be-
cause the oil price St is fully determined by its logarithm
Xt = log(St) ∈ R. We will refer the oil company as
Player 1 and the government as Player 2. We assume that
the processes X(t) and Y (t) follow the dynamics
dX(t) = κ
(
µ(α(t))−X(t))dt
+σ(α(t))dW (t)
+
∫
R γ(α(t))zN¯(dt, dz),
dY (t) = −u1(t)dt,
X(s) = x, Y (s) = y ≥ 0, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T,
(1)
where u1(t) ∈ U1 = [0, u¯1] is the extraction rate chosen
by the company and u2(t) ∈ U2 = [0, u¯2] is the tax rate
chosen by the government. The constant u¯1 represents
the maximum extraction rate and u¯2 is the maximum tax
rate. The processes u1(t) and u2(t) are control variables,
and W (t) is the Wiener process defined on a probability
space (Ω,F , P ). Moreover, we assume that W (t), α(t)
and ηt are independent. The parameter exp(µ(·)) rep-
resents the equilibrium price of oil and κ represents the
coefficient of mean reversion. For each state i ∈ {1, 2}
of the oil market, we assume that the corresponding equi-
librium price exp(µ(i)) is known. Similarly σ(·) repre-
sents the volatility and γ(·) represents and the intensity
of the jump diffusion. For each state i ∈ {1, 2} of the
oil market, we assume that σ(i), γ(i) are known nonzero
constants. As a matter of fact, γ(i) captures the frequen-
cies and jump sizes of the oil price.
Definition 2.1. The extraction and taxation rates u1(·)
and u2(·), taking values on intervals [0, u¯1] and [0, u¯2]
respectively, are called admissible controls with respect
to the initial data (s, x, y, i) ∈ D := [0, T ]×R×[0,K]×
M if:
• Equation (1) has a unique solution with X(s) = x,
Y (s) = y, α(s) = i, and X(t) ∈ R, Y (t) ∈ [0,K]
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
• The processes u1(·) and u2(·) are {Ft}t≥0-adapted
where Ft = σ{α(s),W (s), ηs; s ≤ t}.
2
We use Uj = Uj(s, x, y, i) to denote the set of admissible
controls taking values in Uj = [0, u¯j ] such that X(s) =
x, Y (s) = y, α(s) = i), for each j ∈ {1, 2}.
Let C(t, Y (t), u1(t)) be the extraction cost function
per unit of time t. A typical example of extraction cost
function is C(t, y, u) := a + mu(c − by), where a > 0
can be seen as the initial cost of setting up the oil field and
m, b, and c are constants such that m > 0 and b, c ≥ 0.
The total profit rate for operating the mine is
P (t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t)) = e
X(t)u1(t)−
C(t, Y (t), u1(t)).
The total income tax the government levies on the oil
company is u2(t)θP (t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t)). The post-tax
profit rate of the company is
L1(t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t), u2(t))
= θP (t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t))(1− u2(t)),
and the government profit rate function is
L2(t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t), u2(t))
= (1− θ)P (t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t))+
u2(t)θP (t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t)).
We assume that at the end of the lease there are no ex-
traction revenues, therefore the profit rate for the oil
company could be zero or equal to the cost of closing
the mine. We will denote by Φ1(X(T ), Y (T )) the ter-
minal profit rate for the oil company. In most cases,
Φ1(x, y) := 0. However, the terminal profit rate of the
government is the market value of the remaining reserve,
Φ2(X(T ), Y (T )) = Y (T )(exp(X(T )) −m), where m
is the cost of extracting one barrel. In sum, we will gen-
erally assume that the running profit rate and terminal
profit rate functions Li,Φi, i = 1, 2 are Lipschitz contin-
uous on bounded sets. Given a discount rate r > 0, the
payoff functional of Player i = 1, 2 is
Ji(s, x, y, ι;u1, u2)
= E
[∫ T
s
e−r(t−s)Li(t,X(t), Y (t), u1(t), u2(t))dt
+e−r(T−s)Φi(X(T ), Y (T ))
∣∣∣∣X(s) = x, Y (s) = y,
α(s) = ι
]
.
Each player wants to maximize its own payoff. The com-
pany will try to maximize its payoff by adjusting the ex-
traction rate u1(·), while the government will maximize
its payoff by changing the tax rate u2(·). We, there-
fore, model this interaction as a noncooperative differ-
ential game. Our goal is to find a noncooperative Nash
equilibrium (u∗1, u∗2) such that
J1(s, x, y, ι;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J1(s, x, y, ι;u1, u∗2),
for all u1(·) ∈ U1(s, x, y, ι),
J2(s, x, y, ι;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J2(s, x, y, ι;u∗1, u2),
for all u2(·) ∈ U2(s, x, y, ι).
In the next section we will prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
3 Nash Equilibrium
Definition 3.1. Let (u∗1, u∗2) be a Nash equilibrium of our
differential game, the functions
V1(s, x, y, ι) = sup
u1∈U1
J1(s, x, y, ι;u1, u
∗
2)
V2(s, x, y, ι) = sup
u2∈U2
J2(s, x, y, ι;u
∗
1, u2)
are called value functions of Player 1 and Player 2 re-
spectively.
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In order to find the optimal strategies u∗1 and u∗2 of a
Nash equilibrium we first have to derive the value func-
tions V1 and V2 of the differential game. Formally the
value functions V1 and V2 should satisfy the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. Assuming that we
have a Nash equilibrium (u∗1, u∗2) let us define the cor-
responding Hamiltonians:
H1
(
s, x, y, ι, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂V
∂y
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
= rV − sup
u1∈U1
(
1
2
σ2(ι)
∂2V
∂x2
+ κ
(
µ(ι)− x)∂V
∂x
−u1∂V
∂y
+
∫
R
(
V (s, x+ γ(ι)z, y, ι)− V (s, x, y, ι)
−1{|z|<1}(z)
∂V
∂x
γ(ι)z
)
ν(dz)
+L1(s, x, y, u1, u
∗
2) +QV (s, x, y, ·)(ι)
)
, (2)
and
H2
(
s, x, y, ι, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂V
∂y
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
= rV − sup
u2∈U2
(
1
2
σ2(ι)
∂2V
∂x2
+ κ
(
µ(ι)− x)∂V
∂x
−u∗1
∂V
∂y
+
∫
R
(
V (s, x+ γ(ι)z, y, ι)− V (s, x, y, ι)
−1{|z|<1}(z)
∂V
∂x
· γ(ι)z
)
ν(dz)
+L2(s, x, y, u
∗
1, u2) +QV (s, x, y, ·)(ι)
)
, (3)
with QV (s, x, y, ·)(ι) =
∑
j 6=ι
qιj(V (s, x, y, j) −
V (s, x, y, ι)). The corresponding Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs
equations of this noncooperative game are
∂V1
∂s = H1
(
s, x, y, ι, V1,
∂V1
∂x ,
∂V1
∂y ,
∂2V1
∂x2
)
,
∂V2
∂s = H2
(
s, x, y, ι, V2,
∂V2
∂x ,
∂V2
∂y ,
∂2V2
∂x2
)
,
V1(T, x, y, ι) = Φ1(x, y)
V2(T, x, y, ι) = Φ2(x, y).
(4)
The strategy for solving this differential game is to first
find the solutions of the Isaacs equation (4) and then de-
rive the optimal extraction and taxation policies from the
Nash equilibrium. The next result gives the road map we
will use to find a Nash equilibrium if we already have the
value functions.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that there exists (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ U1 ×
U2 such that the nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equa-
tions (4) have classical solutions Vi(s, x, y, ι), i = 1, 2
with
u∗1(s) = arg max
(
− u1∂V1(s, x, y, ι)
∂y
+L1(s, x, y, u1, u
∗
2)
)
, s ∈ [0, T ]
and
u∗2(s) = arg max
(
L2(s, x, y, u
∗
1, u2)
)
, s ∈ [0, T ].
Then the pair (u∗1, u∗2) is a Nash equilibrium and
Ji(s, x, y, ι;u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = Vi(s, x, y, ι), i = 1, 2.
Proof. The proof relies on the fact that this problem can
be uncoupled and solved as an optimal control problem.
In fact, if we replace the control process u2(·) by u∗2(·)
in (1) then, the differential game problem becomes an
optimal control problem with the only control variable
u1(·). The HJB equation of this new control problem is
∂W1
∂s = H1
(
s, x, y, ι,W1,
∂W1
∂x ,
∂W1
∂y ,
∂2W1
∂x2
)
W1(T, x, y, α(T )) = Φ1(x, y).
(5)
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Following the assumptions of this theorem, it is clear that
the HJB equation (5) has a solution V1 and the optimal
policy of this new control problem is u∗1. Therefore u∗1
is in equilibrium with u∗2 and V1 is the value function of
Player 1. A similar argument can be used to show that u∗2
is in equilibrium with u∗1 and that V2 is the value function
of Player 2. unionsqu
Given that Li,Φi, i = 1, 2 are Lipschitz continu-
ous, using standard methods from control theory it can
be shown that the values functions V1 and V2 are the
unique viscosity solutions of the Isaacs equations (4).
The uniqueness of the viscosity solutions are obtained
as in Barles and Imbert (2008) by applying nonlocal ex-
tensions of the Jensen-Ishii Lemma. For more on the
derivation of the maximum principle for nonlocal opera-
tors, one can also refer to Biswas et al. (2010).
4 Numerical Approximation
In this section, we construct a finite difference scheme
and show that it converges to the unique viscosity so-
lutions of the Isaacs equation (4). We will use the fol-
lowing notations; we set u = (u1, u2), u∗ = (u∗1, u∗2),
U = U1 × U2, and
V (s, x, y, i) =
 V1(s, x, y, i)
V2(s, x, y, i)
 ,
H(s, x, y, i, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂V
∂y
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
=
 H1(s, x, y, i, V1,
∂V1
∂x
,
∂V1
∂y
,
∂2V1
∂x2
)
H2(s, x, y, i, V2,
∂V2
∂x
,
∂V2
∂y
,
∂2V2
∂x2
)
 ,
Φ(x, y) =
 Φ1(x, y)
Φ2(x, y)
 .
The Isaacs equation (4) can be rewritten as follows
∂V
∂s
= H
(
s, x, y, i, V,
∂V
∂x
,
∂V
∂y
,
∂2V
∂x2
)
,
V (T, x, y, i) = Φ(x, y).
(6)
Let k ∈ (0, 1) be the step size with respect to s, and h ∈
(0, 1) be the step size with respect to x and y, we will use
the standard finite difference operators ∆s, ∆x, ∆xx and
∆y. Let If denote the integral part of the Hamiltonians
H1 andH2. We will approximate If using the Simpson’s
quadrature. Using the fact the Le´vy measure is finite Γ =∫
R
ν(dz) <∞, we have
If(s, x, y, i) =
∫
R
f(s, x+ γ(i)z, y, i)ν(dz)
−∂f(s, x, y, i)
∂x
∫ 1
−1
γ(i)zν(dz)− f(s, x, y, i)Γ.
We use the Simpson’s quadrature to approximate the in-
tegral part of the Hamiltonians. Let ξ ∈ (0, 1) be the
step size of the Simpson’s quadrature, the corresponding
approximation of the the integral part is
Iξf(s, x, y, i) =
Nξ∑
j=0
cjf(s, x+ γ(i)zj , y, i)−
∂f(s, x, y, i)
∂x
Mξ∑
j=0
djγ(i)zj − f(s, x, y, i)Γ,
where the (cj)0≤j≤Nξ and (dj)0≤j≤Mξ are the corre-
sponding sequences of the coefficients of the Simpson’s
quadrature and zj ∈ [−1, 1], j ∈ {1, ...,Mξ} are grid
points of the interval [−1, 1]. In fact, lim
Nξ→∞
Nξ∑
j=0
cj = Γ
and lim
Mξ→∞
Mξ∑
j=0
dj =
∫ 1
−1
ν(dz). The corresponding dis-
crete versions of the Hamiltonians H1, H2 are defined as
5
follows
Hh,k,ξ1,u∗2
V1(s, x, y, i)
= rV1(s, x, y, i)− sup
u1∈U1
(
1
2
σ2(i)∆xxV1(s, x, y, i)
+IξV1(s, x, y, i) + κ(µ(i)− x)∆xV1(s, x, y, i)
−u1∆yV1(s, x, y, i) + L1(s, x, y, u1, u∗2)
+QV1(s, x, y, ·)(i)
)
and
Hh,k,ξ2,u∗1
V2(s, x, y, i)
= rV2(s, x, y, i)− sup
u2∈U2
(
1
2
σ2(i)∆xxV2(s, x, y, i)
+IξV2(s, x, y, i) + κ(µ(i)− x)∆xV2(s, x, y, i)
−u∗1∆yV2(s, x, y, i) + L1(s, x, y, u∗1, u2)
+QV2(s, x, y, ·)(i)
)
.
Therefore the discrete version of (6) is
0 = ∆sV −Hh,k,ξu∗1,u∗2V (s, x, y, i),
V (T, x, y, i) = Φ(x, y),
(7)
with
Hj,k,ξu∗1,u∗2
V (s, x, y, i) =
 Hh,k,ξ1,u∗2 V1(s, x, y, i)
Hh,k,ξ2,u∗1
V2(s, x, y, i)
 .
We have the following crucial Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let h ∈ (0, 1) be small enough, for each
k, ξ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique bounded function
Vh,k,ξ defined on D that solves equation (7).
Proof Any solution V of (7) should also satisfy V =
V + (∆s −Hh,k,ξu∗1,u∗2V (s, x, y, i)) for  > 0 together with
terminal condition V (T, x, y, i) = Φ(x, y). We define
the operator Fξ on bounded functions on D as follows
Fξ(V )(s, x, y, i;h, k)
= V + (∆s −Hh,ku∗1,u∗2V (s, x, y, i))
= sup
u∈U
(

k
V (s+ k, x, y, i) + PV (s, x, y, ·)(i)
+b(i)V (s, x− h, y, i) + cu,u∗(i)V (s, x, y, i)
+L(s, x, y, u1, u2) + au,u∗(i)V (s, x+ h, y, i)
+
Nξ∑
n=0
cnV (s, x+ γ(i)zn, y, i)
)
,
Fξ(V )(T, x, y, i;h, k) = Φ(x, y), (8)
where the coefficients qin are coefficients of the gener-
ator Q and the quantities au,u∗(i), b(i) , cu,u∗(i) and
PV (s, x, y, ·)(i) are defined as follows
e(i; v) = 1− 
[
r +
1
k
+
σ2(i)
h2
+
1
h
(
κ(µ(i)− x)
−
Mξ∑
n=0
dnγ(i)zn − v
)
+ Γ +
∑
n6=i
qin
]
,
g(i; v) =
σ2(i)
2h2
+
1
h
(
κ(µ(i)− x)
−
Mξ∑
n=0
dnγ(i)zn − v
)
,
cu,u∗(i) =
 e(i;u1) 0
0 e(i;u∗1)
 ,
PV (s, x, y, ·)(i) =

∑
n6=i
qinV (s, x, y, n) 0
0
∑
n6=i
qinV (s, x, y, n)
 ,
au,u∗(i) = 
 g(i, u1) 0
0 g(i, u∗1)
 ,
6
b(i) =
σ2(i)
2h2
I, I =
 1 0
0 1
 .
Note that equation (7) is equivalent to V (s, x, y, i) =
Fξ(V )(s, x, y, i;h, k), it suffices to show the operatorFξ
has a fixed point. As a matter of fact, for h small enough,
it is clear that g(i, v) > 0 for all i ∈ M and v ∈ U1,
thus both diagonal coefficients of au,u∗(i) are positive.
Moreover, we can choose  such that e(v, i) > 0, for all
v ∈ U1, i ∈M and
au,u∗(i) + b(i) + cu,u∗(i) + 
(
1
k
+
Nξ∑
n=0
cn
+
∑
n6=i
qin
)
I =
(
1− r + ( Nξ∑
n=0
cn − Γ
))
I,
with 0 ≤ 1− r + ( Nξ∑
n=0
cn − Γ
) ≤ δ < 1,
where δ is a constant. Using the fact that the difference of
two suprema is less than the supremum of the difference.
If we have two bounded functions V,W defined on D, it
is clear that
|Fξ(V )(s, x, y, i;h, k)−Fξ(W )(s, x, y, i;h, k)|
≤ δ sup
D
|V −W |.
Therefore, the map Fξ is a contraction on the space of
bounded functions on D, using the Banach’s Fixed Point
Theorem we conclude the proof of the lemma. unionsqu
Remark 4.2. It is clear from Lemma 4.1 that the numer-
ical scheme obtained from (7) is stable since the solution
of the scheme is bounded independently of the step sizes
h, k, ξ ∈ (0, 1) and obviously consistent because as the
step sizes h, k, ξ go to zero the finite difference operators
converge to the actual partial differential operators. We
have the following convergence theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let Vh,k,ξ be the solution of the discrete
scheme obtained in Lemma 4.1. Then as (h, k, ξ) → 0
the sequence Vh,k,ξ converges locally uniformly on D to
the unique viscosity solution V of (6).
This result is the standard method for approximating
viscosity solutions, for more one can refer to Barles and
Souganidis (1991).
5 Applications
Consider an oil company with a 10 years lease to extract
oil from an oil field with an known capacity of K=10 bil-
lion barrels. We assume that the profit sharing agreement
between the oil company and the government is such that
the oil company takes 40% of profits and the government
takes 60%, so θ = 0.4. The oil equilibrium price when
the market is up is µ(1) = 50 and when the market is
down is µ(2) = 35. The mean reversion coefficient is
κ = 0.01, the volatility when the market is up is σ(1) =
0.1 and when the market is down σ(2) = 0.3. And the
jump intensity is λ(1) = 0.01 when the market is up
and λ(2) = 0.15 when the market is down. The genera-
tor of the Markov chain is Q =
 −0.005 0.005
0.002 −0.002
.
We assume that L1(t, x, y, u1, u2) = 0.4(exu1 − (10 +
15u1))(1 − u2) , Φ1(x, y) = 0, L2(t, x, y, u1, u2) =
0.6(exu1 − (10 + 15u1)) + 0.4u2(exu1 − (10 + 15u1)),
and Φ2(x, y) = y(ex − 15). Moreover, we assume
that the extraction u1(·) ∈ [0, 50000] and the top tax
rate is 30% so u2(·) ∈ [0, 0.3]. Keep in mind that,
because the payoff rates are linear functions of each
control variable u1(·) and u2(·), therefore using Theo-
rem 3.2, the optimal strategies u∗1 and u∗2 are obtained
by looking at the signs of the following functionals
F (t, x, y, u2, i) = −∂V1(t,x,y,i)∂y + 0.4(ex − 15))(1 −
u2(t)), and G(t, x, y, u1, i) = 0.4(exu1(t) − (10 +
15u1(t))). The optimal strategies will only be attained
at the endpoints of the intervals U1 = [0, 50000] and
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U2 = [0, 0.3], we have
u∗1(t) =

0 if F (t, x, y, u∗2(t), i) ≤ 0
50000 if F (t, x, y, u∗2(t), i) > 0,
and
u∗2(t) =

0 if G(t, x, y, u∗1(t), i) ≤ 0
0.3 if G(t, x, y, u∗1(t), i) > 0.
In the next two figures we have the plots of the func-
tions F and G when the market is up and when the mar-
ket is down. For instance, in Figure 1 we have plots of the
F and G when the market is bullish, the regions above
the curves represent the domains where signs of F and
G are positive, so in those regions it is always optimal
to extract at full capacity or to tax at the maximal rate.
And the regions below the curves represent the domains
where the signs of F and G are negative, thus in those
regions it is optimal not to extract at all and not to tax the
oil company. In Figure 2, similar plots are given when
the market is bearish.
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Figure 1: This graph represents the optimal regions when
the market is bullish.
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Figure 2: This graph represents the optimal regions when
the market is bearish
8
